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* Competion between public activities and private companies for aviation depot level maintenance
began in 1987. Since then numerous areas of concern have developed in the public/private arena.
One such area is disputes resolution. This thesis addresses the disputes resolution process currently
utilized by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The current administrative process essentially
uses the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) chain of command. This method works well when
NAVAIR and its subordinate activities are involved. However, the introduction of Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC) to administer the "contracts" and the addition of other Services'
depots competing for these awards have forced NAVAIR to readdress its disputes process. The
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not apply to public performing activities, but it is
NAVAIR's policy that its public/private process will operate as if it did. With this in mind,
NAVAIR's disputes process should mirror that which is delineated in the FAR. The litigation portion
of the disputes resulution process outlined in the FAR does not apply to public activities, because the
Government cannot sue itself. Therefore NAVAIR's disputes resolution process should take the form
of Alternate Disputes Resolution (ADR) as delineated in the FAR.
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ABSTRACT
Competition between public activities and private companies for aviation depot level maintenance
began in 1987. Since then numerous areas of concern have developed in the public/private arena. One
such area is dispute resolution. This thesis addresses the disputes resolution process currently utilized
by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The current administrative process essentially uses the Naval
Aviation Depot (NADEP) chain of command. This method works well when NAVAIR and its subordinate
activities are involved. However, the introduction of Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
to administer the "contracts" and the addition of other Services' depots competing for these awards have
forced NAVAIR to readdress its disputes process. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not
apply to public performing activities, but it is NAVAIR's policy that their public/private process will operate
as if it did. With this in mind, the disputes process should mirror the process delineated in the FAR. The
litigation portion of the disputes resolution process outlined in the FAR does not apply to public activities,
because the Government cannot sue itself. Therefore, NAVAIR's dispute resolution process should take
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In 1985 Congress provided for a test program in which the
Navy would compete two or more ship overhauls between public
and private shipyards. [Ref . 1:0MN] As a result, the issue of
how a Government Agency can contract with a subordinate
activity and maintain a fair and level playing field with the
private sector began. In 19 87, the issue expanded to Naval
aviation and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) when Congress
mandated that the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) would compete
against private contractors for selected NAVAIR
requirements. [Ref. 2:0MN] Since that time the concept of
public/private competition for depot level maintenance has
evolved into a hotly contested issue in the Department of
Defense (DoD) and in private industry.
There has been strong emphasis throughout this process on
establishing and maintaining a fair and level playing field
with the private sector. [Ref. 3] In the post-award phase this
has meant several changes from previous practice. From
upgrading accounting systems to designating the source for
Contract Administrative Services (CAS) , the entire post -award
phase had to be, and still is being reorganized.
One post-award issue that is currently the subject of
debate is how to process and decide disputes filed by a NADEP
during the administration of an award which resulted from
public/private competition. This thesis will address that
issue. Keeping the level playing field in mind, the disputes
process will be examined for both private firms and public
activities. Then the disputes process for the NADEPs will be
analyzed for effectiveness and possible improvement.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following questions guided the research for this
thesis
:
1. Primary Research Question:
What are the key problems associated with resolving
disputes between public buying organizations and public
performing activities as a result of public/private
competition and how can the process be improved?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions:
1. What is the current process of disputes resolution
when Government agencies are both the performing and buying
activities?
2. To what extent are disputes being resolved under
the current process?
3. What are the problems associated with the current
process?
4. What modifications can be made to enhance the
process?
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis centers around Naval aviation
depot level maintenance. It became apparent during the
research that NADEPs that win an award as a result of
public/private competition have administrative requirements
which vary significantly from the requirements for private
sector firms that win Government contracts. The disputes
process for the NADEPs is one of the areas that is dissimilar
and is where the research for this thesis was concentrated.
The analysis is directed toward the disputes clause identified
in NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 and how well it accommodates
public activities. The intention is that by examining the
public and private disputes processes, a comparison can be
made and the effectiveness of the public process can be
identified. Further, a comparison of the processes will help
determine if a fair and level playing field is being
maintained. For the purpose of this thesis, public/private
refers to public/private competition of depot level
maintenance in support of NAVAIR assets.
It has become apparent that public/private is a dynamic
program and is under constant scrutiny by Congress
.
[Ref . 4]
Further, the regulations which guide NAVAIR' s public/private
policy are influenced by the rest of the Navy and the other
Services. As a result, the laws and regulations affecting
public/private are in a constant state of flux. This is a
fact of life in this program. To prevent this Thesis from
falling into the same state of flux, only information
available and current at the time of writing will be used.
Proposed or anticipated laws and regulations will not be
assumed as fact. Because public/private competition is a
recent and ever- changing program, there is comparatively
little documentation or readings on the subject. Therefore,
this Thesis will concentrate on interviews as the primary
source of data.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
There were two primary sources of information for this
Thesis, interviews and historical files. The interviews were
conducted in person and by telephone, depending on the
availability of the source. Representatives from NAVAIR, the
Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC) , NADEP Norfolk
Va. and the Administrative Project Office, Norfolk Va. were
interviewed in-depth to gain an understanding of the public
disputes process and public/private in general. Other
interviews were conducted to gain insight or to have specific
questions answered which developed during the research.
Historical files were made available for research by NADOC
which contained past claims and appeals from the NADEPs to the
Successor Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) at NADOC. Also,
contracting officers' final decisions, rationale for those
decisions and opinions from the Office of General Counsel were
made available. Information concerning the private disputes
process was readily available in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) , the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) , the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 and related documents.
E. ORGANIZATION
The basic organization of this Thesis will center around
an examination of the disputes process in the public sector.
Chapter II will provide the historical and chronological
information required to understand the dynamics which drive
NAVAIR's public/private policy. Chapter III will be an
examination of the private sector disputes process and some
strengths and weaknesses. Then Chapter IV will give the same
examination of the public disputes process. Chapter V will
analyze the public disputes process for effectiveness and
provide conclusions and recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will develop a historical background for
public/private competition. First, it will identify the
legislation which has affected public/private competition.
Then it will look at NAVAIR's experience with public/private.
In this section, NAVAIR's first and largest award will be
examined for areas which affect the disputes process. Topics
covered include fair and level playing field, contract
administration services and cost and schedule control systems.
The final section of this chapter will address NAVAIR's policy
toward public/private and how it has changed over the years.
The emphasis of this chapter will be on the post -award aspect
of public/private as it relates to disputes.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The authority to conduct public/private competition for
depot maintenance evolved from a limited authority pertaining
to public and private shipyards. Soon after, Naval Air Rework
Facilities (now NADEPs) were added and eventually, all DOD
depot maintenance activities. Several changes to the
legislation have taken place as the program has evolved and a
brief examination of these changes will provide a good
chronological background.
1. FY 19 85 Appropriations Act
In fiscal year (FY) 1985, Congress appropriated
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) funds for a test
program to compete two or more ship overhauls between public
and private shipyards. [Ref . l:Sect. OMN] The Secretary of the
Navy was further directed to ensure that bids from the public
shipyards and the private shipyards were comparable estimates
of all direct and indirect costs. [Ref. l:Sect. OMN] Congress
acknowledged that the accounting and cost reporting systems at
the NADEPs were not subject to the same requirements and
oversight as the private sector. The intent of the
comparability requirement was to ensure equity between the
public and private bids. [Ref. 5] This requirement has
continued with changes noted below, but industry complaints
about this issue persist.
2. FY 19 87 Appropriations Act
Congress continued the growth of public/private in FY
1987 by expanding its OMN appropriation to include "...the
alteration, overhaul and repair of naval vessels and
aircraft. ..." [Ref . 2: Sect. OMN] The inclusion of the NADEPs
into public/private competition created problems not
encountered at the shipyards. Unlike the shipyards, the
NADEPs were competing for blocks of aircraft to be reworked or
upgraded. There were multiple end items in varying condition,
delivered at inconsistent intervals. Prior to public/private,
this was not a problem. The depots could be flexible about
induction dates and the amount and scope of work to be
accomplished. Under public/private, the Navy was
"contracting" with either a private firm or a depot and the
scope of work and schedule had to be clearly described in the
specifications. These specifications had to take into account
delays, work found "over and above" what was written and many
other aspects.
3. FY 1990 Appropriations Act
Congress significantly changed the public/private
competition legislation in the FY 1990 Appropriations Act by
expanding authority to conduct public/private competition to
all depot maintenance activities:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the
current fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may acquire
the depot maintenance and repair of aircraft, vehicles,
vessels and components, through competition between
Department of Defense depot maintenance activities and
private firms .... The Secretary shall certify that
successful bids include comparable estimates of all direct
and indirect costs for both public and private bids. [Ref
.
6:Sect. 9098]
In addition, a separate provision gave the NADEPs
authority to perform manufacturing and compete for contracts
for the production of Defense articles. [Ref. 6: Sect. 9096]
4. FY 1991 Appropriations Act
The FY 1991 Appropriations Act expanded the
authorization to compete for production contracts to all of
the depots [Ref. 7] and the FY 1991 Authorization Act included
a provision allowing the depots to compete for service
contracts related to defense programs. [Ref . 8] In the report
language of the FY 1991 Appropriations Act, the Senate
Appropriations Committee expressed praise for the program:
The Committee continues to strongly support the Navy-
initiative to compete workload between public facilities
and the private sector. Competition will continue to
provide the most effective means of ensuring the lowest
cost for goods and services. The Committee encourages the
Department to consider a wider application of this
initiative in the continuing defense management
review. [Ref. 8:SAC. 101-521]
As the Army and Air Force enacted their public/private
competitions they encountered the same basic problems that the
Navy was already trying to deal with. Industry complaints
about the depots having an unfair advantage were common. [Ref.
5] The depots were trying to learn how to act like a
business, but decades as a Government activity could not be
changed over night
.
5. FY 1993 Appropriations Act
In response to industry complaints of an unfair
advantage, Congress changed the wording in the FY 1993
Appropriations Act. It required the Department of Defense to
award public/private contracts only if the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) had certified that successful bids had
comparable estimates of all direct and indirect costs. [Ref.
9: Sect. 9095] A similar requirement was already in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and applied to designated
private firms doing business with DoD.[Ref. 10:Part 31.201]
The FAR did not apply to Government agencies, so Congress was
helping to level the playing field.
Since the 19 85 Appropriations Act, the Navy has been
deeply involved in public/private competition. [Ref . 3] The
legislative changes that have occurred since that time not
only show Congress' approval of the program, but also its
concern that the program provide the private sector with an
equal opportunity to win public/private competitions. [Ref. 5]
C. NAVAIR EXPERIENCE
NAVAIR's first and largest public/private competition was
for the Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) of selected F-
14 aircraft in 1988. The competition was for a multi-year
contract consisting of four F-14s in the first year and 20 per
year over the next four years. Also, there was an option for
up to five additional aircraft each year. [Ref. ll:Pg. 9]
There were three proposals submitted: two from private
contractors and one from a team of NADEP Norfolk, Va. and
NADEP North Island, Ca. The NADEPs won the competition with
a bid of $124,453,366. [Ref . 12:Pg. 10]
This award has been the subject of three major audits
since its beginning and these audits have strongly influenced
NAVAIR's policy toward public/private. The three audits by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) , the Naval Audit Service
(NAS) and auditors from the office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN S&L) (now ASN
10
RDA) acknowledged cost savings and efficiency increases at the
NADEPs. They also identified several concerns with the
program. [Re f . ll:Pg. 3]
Because of the extensive oversight and size of the F-14
award, it is an excellent source for examining NAVAIR's
public/private experience. All of the concerns in the post-
award phase affected disputes either directly or indirectly.
The post -award audit concerns can be broken down into three
areas: Fair and level playing field; Contract Administrative
Services (CAS) ; and Cost and Schedule Control Systems (CSCS)
.
CAS relates to the administration of a contract once it has
been awarded and CSCS relates to the NADEP's ability to track
and control costs. Each area will be examined in the
following discussion.
1. Fair and Level Playing Field
Without question, the biggest problem that faced
NAVAIR was the issue of a fair and level playing field between
the public and private sector. This concept influences the
entire spectrum of public/private competition. The question
of how a DoD command can "contract" with a subordinate
activity and have another subordinate activity provide
oversight has serious conflict of interest overtones to the
private sector and they cite many examples. The issue of cost
comparability, discussed earlier, is one such example. It was
not until the FY 1993 Appropriations Act that the NADEPs were
11
required to abide by the same auditing system as private firms
and that came by congressional mandate, not from NAVAIR. [Ref
.
13] The general concern was that NAVAIR and the NADEPs were
not maintaining an arm's length relationship. [Ref . 13]
a. Chinese Wall
To address the conflict of interest problem, NAVAIR
developed what they called the "Chinese wall". The idea was
that there would be an imaginary wall between the people at
NAVAIR and NADOC who represent the NADEPs and the people who
compete and administer the contracts. On the surface the
concept was a good one, but it turned out often that people
working in the same office were on the opposite sides of the
wall and communication problems were common. [Ref. 14] This,
combined with the usual communication problems in a large
organization like NAVAIR, has made changes very slow. Over
time changes have been made at NAVAIR which have improved the
Chinese wall concept and a significant number of the potential
conflict of interest situations have been eliminated.
However, Policy officials at NAVAIR concede that
the appearance of conflict of interest still exists in places,
but that is just the nature of the program and they cannot
remove all of it. [Ref. 14] Industry officials have also
acknowledged that it is not perfect, but the Navy's program is
far more fair than it was and is better than the Air Force
program. [Ref . 15]
12
b . Advantages
There are other issues related to the question of
a level playing field than just conflict of interest. There
are aspects of the program which work in the favor of public
activities and others that work in favor of private industry.
Public activities may have lower overhead rates regardless of
comparability analysis. They have ready access to Government
property and technical libraries. And they may enjoy a less
than arm's length relationship with NAVAIR.
However, it is not a one sided advantage. Public
activities are not provided an opportunity to protest
solicitations and as a Government Agency, their disputes
process is solely administrative. They have no legal
recourse. [Ref . 16] Further, they are subject to unilateral
changes without consideration in return. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires consideration to private
firms for all changes. [Ref. 10: Part 43.204] And perhaps most
important, the NADEPs have almost no data rights. This means
that competitors have access to all of their processes through
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and NAVAIR' s legal
counsel is concerned that, if challenged, the courts might
find that their proposals are "Government documents" and also
available through FOIA. [Ref. 16] It is clear that the issue
of a fair and level playing field is not going to be resolved
13
in the near future and policy officials at NAVAIR are
concerned that it will lead to more problems. [Ref . 16]
2. Contract Administrative Services
The requirement for post -award administration and
"contract" oversight was a new concept for the NADEPs . Why
would they need to duplicate existing financial control,
quality assurance and material control systems? The NADEPs
were Navy facilities that already had internal review
functions and compliance techniques in place. As a result,
the CAS provided to the NADEPs in the beginning was confused
at best. [Ref. 17] NAVAIR, NADOC and the NADEPs had to learn
as they went. As they would soon find out, their existing
controls did not require the depth of preparation and
oversight required in the private sector by the FAR. The NAS
Audit described the NADEPs new relationship as they saw it:
When a Navy activity has successfully competed against a
commercial firm for a contract award, that Navy activity
essentially becomes a "pseudo- contractor" . The role of
the "contractor" carries with it the requirement for post-
award administration and oversight to assure that "a level
playing field" is maintained, i.e., the Navy "contractor"
is subject to essentially the same ground rules and is
treated in essentially the same manner as a commercial
contractor. [Ref . 12:Pg. 7]
NAVAIR quickly adopted this concept and all changes in
the program have this basic concept in mind. With this
concept as a base, NAVAIR had to address the individual CAS
issues that needed improvement.
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The first area to be discussed was what activity would
be tasked to provide CAS for the NADEPs . In December 1990,
NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 was issued. This was the first
comprehensive written direction given in public/private. [Ref
.
18] It provided for Administrative Project Offices headed by
Administrative Project Officers (APOs) to accomplish the bulk
of the contract administration work. Their responsibilities
included:
1. Evaluate, negotiate and authorize new work.
2. Maintain records and conduct status reporting.
3
.
Audit material and parts control for over and above
work. [Ref. 19]
NADOC was assigned successor PCO responsibilities, but
the APOs were placed under the program managers at NAVAIR, not
NADOC. [Ref. 20:Pg. 6] The program managers were not equipped
to provide guidance in contract administration and the APOs
were eventually placed under NADOC for support. [Ref. 21]
Citing lack of training, lack of support and insufficient
manning, each audit was critical of the APO process
.
[Ref s
22,11,12] It was clear that the CAS for public/private had to
be improved
.
Two options for a CAS activity were examined. The
first was to task NADOC with the requirement. This would
provide NAVAIR with the in- house capability to administer its
public/private awards, but NADOC s contracting directorate was
15
small. Significant personnel and funding increases would be
required to accomplish the added responsibility
.
[Ref . 17]
The other option was to request CAS support from the
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) . DCMC administers
DOD private contracts and is staffed to administer added
awards if needed. The major problem was that DCMC did not
provide oversight of other Government activities
.
[Ref . 23]
The Government had its own regulations and internal oversight.
Therefore, DCMC initially did not want to get involved.
Public/private was an entirely new issue and required
a rethinking of DCMC's charter if they were to administer the
awards. If the NADEPS were to act as "pseudo contractors", it
seemed appropriate to NAVAIk that DCMC should provide CAS
support for public/private awards. [Ref 23] Further, since
DCMC already administered private awards, it would help to
level the playing field. After lengthy discussion between
NAVAIR and DCMC and an official support request from NAVAIR,
DCMC decided to accept CAS responsibility for NAVAIR
public/private awards. [Ref. 23] The existing APO structure
will complete administration of the outstanding awards and
DCMC will administer all new contracts.
Whether this move will be effective in providing
quality CAS support to the NADEP contracts remains to be seen,
because NAVAIR has not awarded any public/private contracts
since the decision. It is clear; however, that DCMC will be
16
able to bring the appropriate, qualified personnel in to
administer these contracts.
The next CAS issue that NAVAIR had to address was what
form the CAS document, or "contract" would take. The NADEPs
were to be treated in the same manner, with the same ground
rules as commercial contractors. Therefore, their awards were
to be written and administered just like a contract. This
view was shared by NAVAIR, NADOC and the APOs, but the NADEPs
took a different interpretation. They felt that once they had
won the award, it was business as usual. [Ref . 24] Prior to
public/private competition, Navy depot maintenance on each
type aircraft was performed by one or more of six NADEPs. The
depots were automatically assigned workload by NAVAIR and
their work was completed according to a project order, which
was administered within the NADEP with assistance from NADOC.
The depots were paid a pre-budgeted price for each job based
on labor rates and past experience. [Ref. ll:Pg. 2] There was
no need for extra paperwork, because they viewed the way they
had always done business as being effective. [Ref. 16]
The problem was exacerbated by the fact that there was
no contract to administer. A project order was issued for the
F-14 SDLM just as it had been before public/private and the
APOs were expected to administer it like a contract . [Ref
.
ll:Pg. 21] A project order is really nothing more than a
funding document. This project order contained a few clauses
17
found in a standard contract, but, for the most part looked to
the NADEPs like business as usual.
The NADEPs argued that they should be paid the total
amount authorized in the project order regardless of the
amount approved by the APO. Viewing the contract as just
another project order, they showed little concern if costs
exceeded the amounts authorized by the APO.[Ref. ll:Pg. 22]
Even though NAVAIR wanted the award administered like a
contract, the NADEP bills were paid in full as long as costs
did not exceed the amount in the project order. [Ref. ll:Pg.
22]
Differing opinions and confusion continued until
NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 was issued. As stated earlier, it
was the first definitive instruction for public/private and it
ended the debate for good:
As the government does not contract with itself, should a
competitive workload be won by a public activity, NAVAIR
will issue a work assignment document to that activity.
The work assignment document will include the same
statement of work, price structure, and schedule as the
competed solicitation as well as procedures which are
applicable to a public activity. Although the work
assignment document will not be subject to the provisions,
terms and condition of the federal acquisition
regulations, it will be administered following the terms
and conditions within the document as if it were, in fact,
a contract.... While the document is not actually a
contract, it is an agreement between NAVAIR/PEO and a
public activity.
a. The public activity agrees to:
(1) perform to a specified statement of work;
(2) deliver the product following with the delivery
schedule;
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(3) complete the work at the price/cost bid in their
proposal ; and
(4) perform the work following the specified requirements
b. NAVAIR/PEO agrees to fund the approved work
performed. [Ref. 20:Encl. 1]
The work assignment document (WAD) is the
public/private version of a contract. It has evolved since
the issuance of NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 to the point that
it looks much like a private contract. Though the FAR does
not apply to the WAD, administration can be performed as
though it did apply and a fair and level playing field can be
maintained.
3 . Cost and Schedule Control Systems
The final area of audit concerns affecting disputes is
the cost and schedule control systems used by the NADEPs
.
Their ability to account for work accomplished on specific
aircraft and the tracking of material costs per aircraft was
of specific concern. [Ref. 12:Pg. 1] Also, material purchasing
and handling was addressed. The discussion of cost and
schedule control will involve two areas: cost accounting
procedures and material purchasing.
a. Cost accounting
As discussed earlier, before public/private, the
NADEPs were paid a pre-budgeted price for their assigned work
orders. Under public/private, justification of costs was
required, down to costs assigned to individual aircraft. This
19
was required not just for the fair and level playing field
aspect, but also for negotiating over and above costs and for
providing accurate cost information in future proposals. [Ref
.
ll:Pg. 2]
The NADEPs use the NAVAIR Industrial Financial
Management System (NIFMS) for all of their cost accounting.
The system was designed to provide tracking of project orders
at the NADEPS, but it did not track costs to the degree
required for public/private competition. Specifically, it
could not assign material costs to a job on a specific
aircraft. Nor could it track individual over and above costs
on each aircraft. [Ref. 24] This made it very difficult for
the NADEPs to justify costs and claims for over and aboves
.
NADOC, which is responsible for the design and
maintenance of NIFMS, provided a variety of upgrades to the
system and in 1991 felt that they had made necessary
upgrades. [Ref. 17] The Naval Audit Service Report questioned
the capabilities of the upgraded NIFMS in the public/private
arena. [Ref . 12:Pg. 18] NAVAIR responded that NIFMS was not
subject to FAR requirements as a cost accounting system and
that it had been certified for Government use by the
Comptroller of the Navy. [Ref. 12:Pg. 18] To ensure that the
upgraded NIFMS was sufficient for public/private use, NADOC
requested a DCAA audit of the system. DCAA found that the
system design met all FAR requirements for a cost accounting
system. [Ref. 18]
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Although the system design was sufficient, there
have been significant installation problems. Currently, the
upgraded NIFMS is not fully on line at any of the NADEPs . [Ref
.
25] To compensate for NIFMS' shortcomings, the NADEPs
attempted to develop supplemental accounting systems to
provide justification of costs. Each depot operated
independently of the others, so individual systems were
developed. Compatibility, consistency and accuracy problems
exist as this problem remains unresolved. [Ref. 25]
As pointed out earlier, the NADEPs spent decades
under the project order system. The artisans that worked at
the NADEPs were not trained to document work over and above
the specifications, nor did they closely track parts usage.
Their concern was with the finished product as long as it was
within the project order price. [Ref. 4] Accounting for
material usage and tracking costs was foreign to them. They
were futher confused by the fact that some aircraft were
competed and some were not. The competed aircraft required
tracking and documentation, while the assigned (or non-
competed) aircraft did not. This required extensive training
and a change in attitude. The effectiveness of this training
will be discussed in later chapters.
b. Material purchasing
Being a part of the Navy, the NADEPs operate under
the Navy supply system. The Aviation Supply Office (ASO)
21
operates the aviation side of the Navy supply system. This
creates two problems in the public/private arena. The NADEPS
must operate under the Navy supply system and private firms
normally do not have access to that system. Both sides see
this as a disadvantage.
The NADEPs normally cannot go to the open market
for parts. They must abide by the price and availability of
the supply system. Their only option is to request an "open
purchase" through the Navy Supply Center if parts are not
readily available in the supply system, and this process can
be very time consuming. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that ASO utilizes a priority system for its customers.
Unfortunately for the NADEPs, they are at the bottom of the
list.[Ref. 16] When it comes to obtaining scarce parts, the
NADEPs are almost assured of long delays.
Private firms, on the other hand, did not have
access to the Navy's vast supply network designed to acquire
spare aviation components. They would not be buying parts in
the same volume that ASO did, so they would not get the same
volume discounts. Further, they would have to buy parts after
the award which can create a long lead time, while the NADEPs
have parts readily available in their system. This disparity
has been addressed in current WADs . Should a private firm win
a public/private award, they will be granted access to the
Navy supply system for parts directly associated with the
award. However, the NADEPs are granted deviation from the
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supply system only in the event of excessive delays. [Ref . 31]
They cannot seek better prices or quicker delivery by sub-
contracting with the private sector.
NAVAIR, NADOC and the NADEPs have worked
aggressively to solve the problems in CAS, CSCS and level
playing field with some successes. The F-14 SDLM award has
proven very useful as a testbed for NAVAIR' s public/private
experience to date and that experience has helped to shape
NAVAIR's policy toward public/private. [Ref . 14]
D. NAVAIR PUBLIC/PRIVATE POLICY
1. Initial Policy
In 1986, representatives of NAVAIR and the NADEPs met
to develop a policy on public/private competition. They
enthusiastically endorsed competition and even made plans to
compete for business currently held by the private sector.
Their attitude was not to protect the current base, but
expansion:
There are benefits to be realized through competing with
the private sector. Workload previously considered the
sole provence of prime contractors is now open to
competition. Any additional workload gained through
competition will enhance our technology base and price
competitiveness. By the same token, competition involves
risk. Therefore we must plan to win and organize to do
so. [Ref. 26:Pg. 3]
a. Strategy




a. Focus on near- term competitions that reflect immediate
cost savings to the Navy.
b. Organize to meet short-term competition without
jeopardizing the long-term health of the organization.
c. Develop a competitive cost structure comparable to
private industry.
d. Prepare a corporate proposal that reflects our most
competitive position.
e. Establish audit controls for execution of contracts
which meet requirements of DODINST 7002 that include
financial, labor, material and progress reporting.
f
.
Plan to win, but develop contingency plans that will
minimize the impact of losing. [Ref. 26:Pg. 3]
During the research, it became clear that NAVAIR's
aggressive attitude toward public/private was overenthusiastic
.
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) reported cost savings and
efficiency increases without great upheaval and NAVAIR expected the
same. They originally identified about $ 2.2 billion in annual
funding that was eligible for competition and 15 programs were
targeted over the successive five years. [Ref. 12:Pg. 1] They soon
discovered that public/private competition was not as easy as they
thought. Lacking sufficient personnel, organic capability and
technical data, they discovered that turning NADEP specifications
into a competitive request for proposal was an enormous task.
Delays in funding approval created further difficulties. As a
result of these difficulties, NAVAIR only competed four programs
from 1988 through 1990, for a total of $211 million. [Ref. 12:Pg. 1]
NAVAIR's initial difficulties, combined with the
problems identified in the audit reports, were making
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public/private a real headache for NAVAIR, but these were not the
only forces affecting their policy. Laws, regulations and
influence from other Services helped to shape this policy.
Probably the most influential factor, however, has been economics.
In 1986, the Navy was looking forward to a 600 ship fleet and
NAVAIR was accustomed to an expanding budget. It is logical to
assume that this idea of expansion would carry over into NAVAIR'
s
public/private policy. The Navy was expanding, so the Navy's depot
capabilities should expand along with it. Seven years later, with
a dramatically declining defense budget, the Navy is cutting back
on everything while trying to maintain basic capabilities. It
follows that this must also have a logical influence on NAVAIR'
current policy.
2. Current Navy Policy
Having looked briefly at the Navy's experiences with
public/private competition, an examination of the current
competition policy is appropriate. The exuberance about
public/private competition seen in the initial strategy has changed
over the years as NAVAIR has worked to make it a viable way to save
money for the Navy. [Ref . 14] There is no longer any interest in
taking work away from private industry. In fact, there is a
striking change:
The Navy's strategy in the downsizing environment is to
maintain only a minimum level of organic capacity, consistent
with future force levels, that is necessary to sustain
peacetime readiness and war fighting surge capability. The
Navy will work in partnership with the commercial aerospace
industry and the commercial ship building industry to make
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maximum use of their production capabilities and capacity.
The strategy will enable the Navy to help preserve the private
sector industrial base without compromising its responsibility






Specifically the Navy's strategy is to:
1. Define minimum core requirements (capabilities, capacity
and workload) necessary to maintain fleet readiness through
the life cycle. This core work will not be offered to
industry.
2. Close excess depots as expeditiously as possible,
consistent with BRAC guidelines.
3. Rightsize remaining depots to perform core work.
Investment strategies for military construction, base
improvements, and equipment will support core work and will
not duplicate capabilities and capacity available in the
private sector.
4. Offer non-core to industry for competition. Navy depots
will not compete against private industry, unless there are
insufficient commercial competitors.
5. Develop commercial contract guidelines that specify
readiness requirements.
6. Develop a long-range plan which identifies Navy core work,
and work that will be available for industry, allowing both
government and industry to make long-term strategic decisions.
7. Transition to this industrial strategy concurrent with




NAVAIR's shift from expansionism to protectionism is very
apparent when the two public/private policies are compared. The
factors discussed above have driven this policy to the point that
NAVAIR wants to use this program only to prevent a sole source
situation on work competed above the core. This dramatic policy
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shift will most certainly reduce the public/private awards to be
administered and, consequently, the need for disputes resolution.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the historical background necessary to
understand the public/private disputes process. By examining the
legislative history, the NAVAIR experience and NAVAIR's
public/private policies, the background is now available to




This chapter will address the disputes process as it
applies to the private sector. The Contract Disputes Act of
1978 created the current process and this chapter will examine
its incorporation into the FAR. Also, key detractors from the
process will be identified. The FAR also recommends Alternate
Disputes Resolution (ADR) as an option to the legal process
delineated by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. [Ref . 10: Part
33.214] The ADR concept will be discussed along with the
primary types of ADR to ensure clear understanding for
possible application in later chapters.
B. CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 197 8
In 1978, Congress passed the Contract Disputes Act which
outlined contractor and contracting officer responsibilities,
as well as establishing the agency boards of contract appeals.
It further outlined the judicial review process of board
decisions. [Ref. 28:Pg. 667] One of the provisions contained in
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 was for contractors to make
claims directly to the contracting officer. They could appeal
unfavorable decisions to either the General Services Board of
Contract Appeals (GSBCA) or the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) , or they could bring an appeal
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directly to the United States Claims Court. [Ref. 28:Pg. 667]
If the contractor disagreed with the ASBCA or GSBCA decision,
they could appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. Once
inside the U.S. Court system, decisions of lower courts could
be appealed to higher courts, including the United States
Supreme Court if warranted. This ensured that justice would
be served to the maximum extent possible.
1 . Drawbacks
When the FAR was published in 1984, the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978 was fully incorporated. [Ref . 10: Part
33.202] The process described above has become the standard
for disputes resolution in the private arena. Unfortunately,
by its nature, this process has one major drawback. Anyone
who has had experience with the court system knows that it is
a very long and potentially expensive process. This can,
understandably, result in contractors being reluctant to
appeal a dispute to the U.S. Courts.
Even appealing a dispute through the agency boards can
be very time consuming. [Ref . 29:Pg. 17] The following time
factors resulting from the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 can
add up very quickly: 1. The contracting officer has up to 60
days to decide a claim by the contractor. 2. The contractor
has up to 9 days to appeal that decision to the ASBCA or the
GSBCA. 3. If the amount in dispute is less than $50,000, the
contractor can elect to utilize the "accelerated" method,
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according to which the board has 180 days to reach a decision.
4 . The average case now in the ASBCA lasts from two to four
years or longer. [Ref. 29:Pg. 151]
A brief examination shows that the process established
by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 may indeed be fair, but
it is also quite long. The system has also been subject to
other criticisms. One such complaint is that the decision
authority may be given to contracting officers, administrative
judges, or even court judges with no substantial expertise in
the area of the dispute. Another allegation is that the legal
system promotes adversarial relationships between the parties
involved. [Ref . 29:Pg. 39]
C. ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT
These problems were identified by Congress when it passed
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (P.L. 101.552) . It
acknowledged that "...proceedings have become increasingly
formal, costly and lengthy. . . " and that "... alternative means
can lead to more creative, efficient and sensible
outcomes. ..." [Ref . 28:Pg. 477] As a result of this act, the
FAR was amended with a new policy statement promoting ADR:
The Government's policy is to try and resolve all
contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at
the contracting officer's level. Agencies are encouraged
to use alternative disputes resolution (ADR) procedures to
the maximum extent practicable in accordance with the
authority and requirements of the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (Pub.L. 101.552) and agency policies. [Ref.
10:Part 33.204]
30
It would seem that the intent is to elevate ADR to the
primary process for disputes resolution. Given the emphasis
on ADR in the FAR, a base knowledge of ADR is required for
future application.
D. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION
Alternative disputes resolution is defined in the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act as "any procedure used
in lieu of adjudication" . [Ref . 29:Pg. 478] This broad
definition opens up numerous opportunities. The form that ADR
takes is entirely up to the parties involved. ADR has taken
some basic, accepted forms over the years and can be broken
down into primary and hybrid forms
.
1 . Primary Forms
The primary forms include arbitration, mediation and
negotiation. [Ref . 29:Pg. 69]
a . ArJbi tra tion
Arbitration can generally be defined as a process
where disputants refer the issue to an impartial third party,
selected by them, to give a decision based on the evidence and
arguments to be presented. The parties agree in advance that
the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding. [Ref
.
29:Pg. 44]
Some advantages of arbitration are: 1. It is a much
faster process than litigation. 2. It is less complicated
than litigation. 3. It is generally less expensive than
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litigation. 4. The parties involved have control over who
will decide the dispute. [Ref . 29:Pg. 69]
Some of the disadvantages of arbitration are: 1.
Arbitration is still adversarial in nature, with a win/lose
outcome. 2. Arbitrators are not bound by any previous
decisions; therefore, outcomes are difficult to predict. 3.






Mediation can be defined as a process by which an
impartial mediator guides the disputants to a negotiated
settlement. The mediator employs a variety of skills to
promote communication and eventual agreement, but has no
decision making authority
.
[Ref . 29:Pg. 45]
The advantages that apply to arbitration also apply
to mediation in that it is faster, cheaper and less expensive
than litigation. Further, it is non-adversarial and the goal
is a win/win agreement. Additionally, mediation provides the
flexibility for disputants to address a wide range of complex
issues in creating an overall agreement. [Ref. 29:Pg. 219] The
key disadvantages to mediation are that disputants often have
taken positions based on principles that are beyond
negotiation. The issue in dispute may also require a
determination of direct responsibility. Parties in mediation
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have a difficult time deciding responsibility between
themselves. [Ref. 29:Pg. 222]
c . Negotia tion
Negotiation is generally considered to be
relatively informal communication between parties in an effort
to reach an agreement on a specific issue. [Ref. 29:Pg. 415]
Negotiation can span from informal phone conversations between
decision makers to high priced negotiators matching their
skills in a labor dispute. Since negotiation can take so many
forms, there are no established rules; however, certain
fundamentals apply. These include a thorough knowledge of the
facts, proper planning and active listening. [Ref. 29:Pg. 418]
The key advantages identified for arbitration and
mediation, specifically, lower cost, less time and less
complication, apply to negotiation also. Further, the parties
involved have complete control over the agenda and the
process. It is a non- adversarial process intended to maintain
strong long term relationships between the parties
involved. [Ref . 29:Pg. 429]
Negotiations also have some inherent disadvantages.
First of all, both parties must be willing to negotiate.
Further, there is no guarantee that an agreement will be
reached, or that both parties will abide by that agreement.
An additional problem is that sometimes the abilities of the
negotiator become more important than the facts at hand.
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2 . Hybrid Forms
As it would seem, there are numerous forms of hybrid
ADR. Some of the current popular hybrids are private judging,
expert fact finding, mini- trials and summary jury trials. [Ref
.
29:Pg. 70] The idea behind hybrid forms of ADR is that an
existing form can be tailored to suit a specific situation to
provide maximum advantages and minimum disadvantages to the
parties involved. Two current forms of ADR have generic
application to public/private, so a brief examination may be
useful. These forms are called Med-Arb and Administrative
Arbitration.
a. Med-Arb
Med-Arb is a hybrid of mediation and arbitration in
which the "med-arbiter" is authorized by both parties to serve
first as a mediator and then as an arbitrator empowered to
decide any issues not resolved though mediation. [Ref . 29:Pg.
45] The intent of med-arb is that through mediation, the
adversarial impact of arbitration is reduced which promotes
stronger relations between the parties involved. The
mediation will improve communication, allowing some disputes
to be resolved without the need for arbitration. This
improved communication can also help prevent disputes in the
future. The arbitration portion can then be used when the
parties cannot come to a mediated agreement.
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Jb. Administrative Arbitration
Administrative arbitration is a variation on
arbitration in which the arbitrator is either chosen by the
Government Agency involved in the dispute or the arbitrator is
chosen from within the Government Agency by the
disputants. [Ref. 29:Pg. 337] The idea is that within the
Agency involved in the dispute is a person with sufficient
expertise and availability to sit as the arbitrator and that
as a Government employee their services could be obtained at
a very reasonable price, often at no charge. [Ref. l:Pg. 317]
The obvious drawback is that there is a potential that this
person could be biased toward the Agency and a fair result may
not be possible. The application becomes a little more
beneficial when responsibility is not in question, but only a
determination of value. Also, since most Government agencies
are very large, an employee with no vested interest in the
dispute is potentially available.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the private disputes process
from the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 to FAR passages in
determining the current path a dispute takes to its
conclusion. During this path, litigation becomes a major cost
and time influence. As an alternative to litigation, this
chapter introduced alternative dispute resolution in some of
its key forms. It should be noted here that if public/private
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competition is going to maintain a fair and level playing
field, the public disputes process must fit within the




This chapter will examine the disputes process as it
relates to the public arena. Though much has been proposed,
there is little written direction concerning the public aspect
of the disputes process
.
[Ref . 14] The central directive for
NAVAIR's disputes process is NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35. The
following discussion will concentrate on this instruction.
Difficulties with this process will be examined, as well as
changes to the WADs that DCMC administers. Keeping in mind
that this is an ever- changing process, only NAVAIR Instruction
4200.35 and actual language in current WADs will be considered
legitimate requirements for the NADEPs
.
B. APPLICATION
Since the Government cannot contract with itself, the
volumes of FAR and DFARS guidance do not apply to the NADEPs
.
However, as discussed earlier, it is NAVAIR's policy that the
WAD contain all of the standard terms and clauses required by
the FAR. This provides for interpretation and administration
consistency in the post-award area.
In application to disputes, however, this concept can only
go so far. The Government cannot sue itself. Therefore, the
legal aspect of the disputes process simply does not apply to
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Government agencies and their subordinate activities. The
apparent result is that the public disputes process cannot
parallel the requirements set forth in the FAR and a fair and
level playing field cannot be maintained. However, just
because the public disputes process cannot parallel the legal
process set forth in the FAR, does not mean that it cannot
comply with the intent of the FAR. Therefore, it stands to
reason that a viable public disputes process should
incorporate the portions of the FAR that can be applied.
C. PROCESS
The GAO review and the ASN (S&L) audit examined NAVAIR's
disputes process for the F-14 award and both were critical of
the process. [Ref . 14] Lacking a clear procedure for disputes
resolution, [Ref. 22:Pg. 7] NAVAIR was expected to take the ASN
(S&L) recommendation for action:
NAVAIR: Establish an independent arbitration board at the
NAVAIR HQ level to resolve disagreements/disputes in such
areas as technical requirements, interpretation of project
order terms and conditions, etc. (...). [Ref. 22:Pg. 6]
1. NAVAIR Instruction. 4200.35
The resulting directive created a chain that goes from
the NADEPs to the WAD administering agent (APO) . If the NADEP
disagreed with the APO decision, they could appeal to the PCO
(NADOC) . If they disagreed with NADOC, they could appeal to
NAVAIR (AIR- 02) and again to COMNAVAIR if necessary. [Ref.
20:Encl. 1] It is expected that AIR-02 will be the final
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authority on all but the most contentious issues. Essentially
all that NAVAIR has done is take the NADEP's chain of command
and make it their disputes process. It might seem that the
NADEPs would have trouble with this process because there is
no opportunity to appeal outside their chain of command, let
alone any kind of board, such as the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . And from a level playing field
aspect, this does not parallel the legal process described in
the preceding chapter.
Interestingly, as NAVAIR has applied this process,
only two real problems have emerged: a. level playing field,
and b. training. [Ref . 25]
a. Level playing field
As discussed earlier, the fair and level playing
field applies to all aspects of public/private. Given the
congressional awareness of public/private, it is highly
probable that the GAO will review NAVAIR' s public/private
again. NAVAIR must make every effort to level the playing
field in all aspects of public/private or face another
disturbing review by the GAO. By not paralleling the FAR,
their disputes policy in NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 does not
help that cause. [Ref. 30]
Jb . Training
The second problem relates back to the training of
the APOs and the NADEP personnel. The APOs were singled out
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by the NAS audit as being poorly trained to administer NADEP
awards. [Ref . 12:Pg. 20] NAVAIR and NADOC have worked with the
APOs, gaining excellent results . [Ref . 21] Training and
staffing at the APO level is now at appropriate levels. [Ref.
21]
Training at the NADEPs, unfortunately has not
achieved the same results
.
[Ref . 25] As identified earlier,
the artisans that work on the aircraft had to be trained to
document "over and above" actions down to specific aircraft
and work breakdown structure. This has been slow in coming.
NADEP documentation is the primary source of disputes that are
appealed beyond the APO level. [Ref. 14] The primary cause of
these disputes is the failure on the part of the NADEPs to
provide substantiating documentation to back up their
claims. [Ref. 14] The NADEPs have a mindset of getting the job
done, paperwork or not. That mindset may work fine for non-
competed aircraft, but NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35 directs that
competed aircraft must be handled according to WAD
requirements
.
[Ref . 20:Pg. 3]
c. Results
Interestingly, the NADEPs indicate that they have
no major complaints about NAVAIR' s disputes process. [Ref. 16]
It is seen as fair, because AIR- 02 and COMNAVAIR are in the
chain of command for both the NADEPs and the APOs. [Ref. 16]
The NADEPs see AIR- 02 and COMNAVAIR as unbiased arbitors. The
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APOs have expressed no major complaints about the system
either. [Ref . 24] They add that the NADEPs are improving their
documentation of "over and above" work. [Ref. 24] This,
combined with a cost and schedule control system that can
adequately account for the NADEP's work is expected to reduce
disputes to a very small number. Both the NADEPs and the APOs
see the F-14 award as a learning experience and are relatively
happy with the results. [Refs. 4,24] They simply would like to
have seen the process mature faster than in the past. [Refs.
4,24]
The NADEPs and the APOs are key players in the
disputes process. They do not have any real problems with it
as addressed by NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35. However, the
process must stand up to the level playing field question and
the entrance of other Government agencies.
2. DCMC Addition
The addition of DCMC into the public/private arena is
creating new issues that NAVAIR must address. [Ref. 14] There
are now two Government Agencies involved in the disputes
process. As with any two Government Agencies working together




NAVAIR sees DCMC as filling the role of the
APO. [Ref. 14] DCMC is accustomed to having most PCO
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responsibilities delegated to them and making contracting
officers' final decisions on administrative matters. They do
not like the idea of the successor PCO at NADOC having the
authority to overturn the decision of a DCMC contracting
officer who is the ACO. [Ref . 30] Further, DCMC feels that
more must be done to level the playing field. They do not
want the GAO to audit public/private and implicate DCMC with
unfair practices. [Ref. 30]
Jb. Results
Several meetings between NAVAIR and DCMC have
resulted in only minor changes to NAVAIR' s disputes
process. [Ref. 30] The provisions in the two most recent WADs
describe a process very similar to the one in the NAVAIR
Instruction. The NADEPs are to make claims to the
Administrative Contracting Officer (DCMC ACO) . If they
disagree with the ACO, they are to appeal to the NAVAIR PCO
(NADOC) . If they still disagree, they are to appeal to AIR-
02, who will be the final authority. [Ref. 31: Sect. G] This is
the current disputes process according to NAVAIR. [Ref. 14]
However, it is unclear how long this policy will
last. Policy officials at NAVAIR and DCMC agree that this is
not yet a finished product. [Refs. 14,30] It is just an
attempt to improve the process for the two recent awards. The




External factors are also affecting NAVAIR's disputes
process. The most current is the participation of other
public activities in competition. This is referred to as
public/public competition. The intricacies of public/public
competition are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the
influence of public/public on public/private warrants
discussion.
Since the 1990 Appropriations Act, all DoD depots have
been authorized to compete with private industry for selected
work. [Ref . 6] A recent hybrid of this authorization is depots
competing against each other, or competing against each other
and private firms. Under this competition, NAVAIR could make
an award to an Air Force depot. That depot would perform the
work while DCMC administered the WAD. In the event of a
dispute, the depot can only appeal back to NAVAIR, who
originally competed the work. This puts a new twist on the
level playing field aspect, but the implications are clear.
The Air Force depot may not view Air- 02 as an unbiased
arbitrator. After all, it is NAVAIR's money that is being
spent
.
Another influence that arises from public/public
competition is similar to that discussed when DCMC became
involved in public/private competition. If a depot from
another Service wins a NAVAIR competition, there would then be
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three Government agencies involved and the problems of
priorities and power struggles could begin again.
The additional requirements of public/public
competition creates even more demands on NAVAIR's disputes
process. That process must accommodate the addition of DCMC
and the influence of public/public competition. Further, if
it is to be truly equitable, it must also parallel the FAR.
This is becoming a very difficult task, but one that is not
out of reach.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the disputes process has been examined as
it relates to NAVAIR. It has shown that NAVAIR is under
pressure to revise its process. Internal factors such as the
level playing field and external factors such as public/public
competition are forcing NAVAIR to rethink its process. If
NAVAIR is going to develop a disputes process which fulfills
all of the requirements placed on it, they must go back to the
FAR. If they can comply with FAR requirements, then they will
have the base for an effective disputes process that is not so
easily open for interpretation. Even though the FAR does not
apply, simply complying with it anyway will give the process
credibility when other agencies become involved.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the public disputes process for
effectiveness. Understanding that to maintain a fair and
level playing field, the public disputes process should
parallel the FAR, this chapter will show where the FAR can
apply. ADR principles will also be applied to minimize any
inconsistencies. Also, the primary and secondary research
questions will be reviewed to ensure that they have been
adequately answered. The end result will show a clear path
for recommendations given at the end of this chapter.
B. FAR APPLICATION
It has been shown that NAVAIR's disputes process does not
parallel the standard litigation disputes process identified
in the FAR. [Ref . 10: Part 33.202] It has also been shown that
NAVAIR's process should comply with the intent of the FAR in
order to maintain a fair and level playing field. Noting the
previous points, it is evident to the researcher that NAVAIR's
disputes process should encompass ADR as outlined in the FAR.
The current process already fits within the broad definition
identified in Chapter III, so only changes made to address
effectiveness and level playing field should be required.
45
Interestingly, NAVAIR does not acknowledge their process
as a potential form of ADR, or that this process might, in
fact comply with the FAR. When asked about ADR, one NAVAIR
official stated that NAVAIR (collectively) does not know
enough about ADR to apply it successfully. [Ref . 14] It would
seem that learning more about applying ADR would be much
simpler than responding to criticism about the fairness of
their process.
C. EFFECTIVENESS
Having identified the public disputes process in Chapter
IV, it is incumbent to analyze the process for effectiveness.
The key to any effective dispute process is that it resolves
disputes in a manner which is agreeable to the parties
involved. As discussed earlier, the NADEPs and the APOs agree
that NAVAIR' s process is fair and unbiased, because AIR- 02 is
in both of their chains of command. Also, the researcher has
found that AIR- 02 has no vested interest in who "wins" these
disputes. The motivation, it seems, is to resolve the issues
in a timely manner, so funding issues can be cleared up and
some form of precedence is given for future issues. There was
a genuine concern both at NADOC and AIR- 02 that a dispute be
resolved as fairly and as quickly as possible, so that the APO
and the NADEP would have clear direction if a similar issue
developed in the future.
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1. Current Policy
The push by AIR- 02 and NADOC for timely decisions
warrants further examination. To date there have been only
six disputes appealed to AIR-02.[Ref. 14] All others were
resolved at the APO or NADOC level. The length of time from
a NADEP appeal to NADOC to the final decision by AIR- 02 ranged
from approximately six to nine months. When compared to the
time frames discussed in Chapter III, this is excellent
response time. Further research indicates that response times
would have been faster if not for an added step by NADOC.
When the successor PCO gave a decision on an appeal, it was
always routed through NADOC 's legal counsel for accuracy of
supporting documentation and identification of potential weak
points from a legal standpoint.
Based on the information available, it has become
clear to the researcher that NAVAIR's current disputes
resolution process is a viable and effective form of disputes
resolution. However, as identified earlier, it must be
flexible enough to be effective when DCMC and/or another
Service's depot are involved.
2. DCMC
As discussed earlier, DCMC is concerned that NADOC
s
PCO will have the power to overturn the decision of one of its
ACOs. The researcher can find no foundation for this concern.
There is no reason whatsoever to question the decision- making
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ability of NADOC's PCOs, or DCMC's ACOs . Further, it is the
PCO's prerogative to maintain or delegate his authority to
render the contracting officer's final decision. [Ref . 10: Part
42.202] That is a decision to be made by the PCO, not DCMC.
DCMC's concern about NADOC's PCOs did, however,
highlight an inefficiency in NAVAIR's dispute process. The
DCMC ACOs are fully qualified to render contracting officers'
final decisions. By delegating authority to the ACO, NADOC
can be removed from the chain and the process shortened.
Given the experience of DCMC's ACOs, there is no reason to
expect that the quality of the decisions would decrease.
Inefficiencies aside, it is the researcher's opinion
that NAVAIR's disputes process will continue to be effective
when DCMC assumes WAD administration.
3 . Competing Depots
As discussed earlier, the addition of another
Service's depot creates a potential conflict of interest with
AIR- 02 as the final dispute authority. This appearance of
conflict of interest should be addressed by NAVAIR, since it
is likely that another Service's depot will win one of
NAVAIR's competed awards. In this case a separate decision
authority could be identified by NAVAIR and the depot at a
post -award conference.
It has been recommended by NADOC that an official from
DCMC act as the final decision authority vice AIR- 02. This
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would remove NAVAIR from the disputes process and remove the
appearance of a conflict of interest. AIR- 02 is currently-
unwilling to relinquish all decision authority to DCMC, but
might be willing to relinquish decision authority in disputes
with other Service depots. [Ref. 14]
DCMC is also concerned that there would be an appearance
of a conflict of interest if a DCMC official provided final
determination on a dispute involving a DCMC ACO.[Ref. 30]
Though there are some potential shortcomings, this idea should
not be discarded too quickly by NAVAIR. If utilized, the
process would closely resemble that described by
administrative arbitration and the depot involved may be
entirely comfortable with it.
Though NAVAIR' s disputes process may not be as
efficient as possible, it is evident that it is effective and
can continue to be effective with some changes.
D. APPLIED ADR
Chapter III discussed the background of ADR and some of
the forms it can take. However, the key to ADR is that it can
take the form that best suits the parties involved. It does
not have to fall within specific guidelines or meet certain
requirements before it can be called ADR. The FAR describes
only four basic elements of ADR:
(1) Existence of an issue in controversy;
(2) Voluntary participation of both parties in ADR;
(3) Agreement on procedures and terms; and
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(4) Participation by officials with authority to resolve the
issue in dispute.
When applying ADR to public activities, the researcher
would add one more element. The form of ADR chosen must be
ethical and represent to the public that justice is being
served. With these five elements as a guide, ADR can be
applied quite easily to NAVAIR's dispute process. By
identifying it as ADR and making changes to maintain a fair
and level playing field, NAVAIR will have an available dispute




Thus far public/private competition has been examined for
background information. The private dispute process, to
include litigation and ADR, has been developed. The public
dispute process has also been examined for effectiveness and
improvement. It has been shown that NAVAIR's dispute process
for the NADEPs is effective and, with changes, this process
can be effective for other depots. The avenue through which
NAVAIR's dispute process can maintain a fair and level playing
field is ADR. By complying with the ADR requirements in the
FAR, NAVAIR can show that its process is not only effective,
but also fair. This will help prevent another poor review by
the GAO.
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F. CONCLUSIONS ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the key problems associated with resolving
disputes between public buying organizations and public
performing activities as a result of public/private
competition and how can the process be improved?
As discussed in Chapter IV, the key problems
associated with the public disputes process are training and
a level playing field. Training is necessary because of the
inability of the NADEPs to properly document over and above
costs, which are the primary source of disputes. Training at
the NADEPs is improving over time which promises to reduce
disputes from the source.
The level playing field aspect has direct influence on all
of public/private. To maintain a fair and level playing
field, the public dispute process should mirror the process
outlined in the FAR. According to NAVAIR and DCMC, it does
not, because it cannot provide for litigation. Though they
may be unwilling to recognize it, it is the researcher's
opinion that NAVAIR' s policy can mirror the FAR in the form of
ADR. With changes to be recommended, this process can also be




2 . Subsidiary Research Questions
1. What is the current process of disputes resolution
when Government agencies are both performing and buying
activities?
As discussed in Chapter IV, the current process is
delineated by NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35. The NADEP makes a
claim to the APO. The NADEP can appeal an unfavorable
decision to NADOC and again to AIR- 02 if needed. This is an





To what extent are disputes being resolved under
the current process?
The total number of disputes appealed to AIR- 02 is
small, which is a good initial indication of the system's
effectiveness. The key players in this process are the NADEPs
and the APOs and they expressed no major complaints about the
process. This again is a good indicator that the process is
effective. Additionally, response times have been very good.
These indicators show that the process is effective when
applied within NAVAIR.
3. What are the problems associated with the current
process?
The current process was designed as an internal,
administrative form of disputes resolution. Since it does not
mirror the FAR, it is open to interpretation concerning the
fair and level playing field and its application to other
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agencies. This problem can be effectively eliminated if
changes are made so that the process clearly mirrors FAR
requirements
.
4. What modifications can be made to enhance the
process?
NAVAIR's process is a generic form of ADR. To
maintain the fair and level playing field, changes should be
made to improve the process within the broad ADR guidelines in
the FAR. Most importantly, they must acknowledge it as a form
of ADR and identify it as such in NAVAIR Instruction 4200.35
and in their WADs . Once this is done, changes can be made as
required to address changing situations as long as they stay
within the guidelines set forth in the FAR.
G. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. As per 5 USC 581(b) , each Agency should have a Disputes
Resolution Specialist to advise and train personnel in
alternate disputes resolution. [Ref . 28:Pg. 478] It is
recommended that policy officials at NAVAIR seek this person's
assistance.
2. It is recommended that NAVAIR identify in NAVAIR
Instruction 4200.35 and in WADs that the disputes process of
choice is ADR.
3. It is recommended that the finalized form of ADR be
agreed upon at the post -award orientation conference.
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4. It is recommended that NAVAIR make changes to the
current process to address the fair and level playing field
and DCMC concerns. This process should then be used as a base
form of ADR for NAVAIR. Since this is ADR, changes can be
made to suit individual contracts, or even individual disputes
if necessary.
H. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas warrant further research:
1. Public/public competition is growing rapidly among
DoD's depots. An evaluation of its effectiveness will aid
NAVAIR and the NADEPs in determining their involvement
.
2. There appeared to be a lack of interest/knowledge in
ADR implementation at NAVAIR. A practical ADR implementation
handbook would be a very useful tool for NAVAIR' s contracting
officers and administrators. An analysis of ADR forms
applicable to NAVAIR' s public/private process and
recommendations for their use should be key research points.
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